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Abstract
The reason why I chose the issue of transparency is that I have a personal stake in the matter.
Now someone has said that the European Union is really a conspiracy of the initiators. At the
time the European Community (or “Community”) was created, we had a totally different political
culture, both in the Member States, but certainly in the international field. The European Community concentrated on highly technical matters–economic matters, trade matters, matters that were
relevant to the farmers, and the public at large was really not very interested. In general, the concept of democracy was a somewhat different one, so it is understandable that the focus at the time
was on the executive and not on the legislative powers. We are now, thirty-five years later, talking
about the democratic dimension, about the lack of legitimacy, and national parliaments’ attempt
to claim back power. They are not trying to claim back power from the European Parliament; they
are claiming back something that they lost forty years ago, from their governments. They have
woken up to the fact that they cannot recuperate it, just as you cannot undo an omelette once you
have broken the eggs. That is the reason why a High Council of national parliamentarians would,
in my view, be a bad thing; it would be a very retrograde action.

TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
LaurensJan Brinkhorst*
The reason why I chose the issue of transparency is that I
have a personal stake in the matter. I would like to start with a
small anecdote. In 1973, I was a young minister in the Dutch
Government, and I attended my very first Council of Ministers.
It has marked my view on the European Union (or "Union")
ever since. That meeting started as every Council meeting with
the adoption of the so-called A-points, points not up for debate
but for information only. At the time, the resolutions of the European Parliament were only A-points. The Belgian President of
the Council said, "First the A-points. Let's just take note, with
one stroke of the hammer, of the resolutions of the European
Parliament." I had been on the train from The Hague to Brussels for two hours and I had actually read some of the resolutions. In them, I found a number of interesting points, so I was
very disappointed that the Belgian President was suggesting that
we should not discuss them. I raised my little finger, and I said,
"Mr. Chairman, before you actually adopt the A-points, I would
like us to discuss one interesting resolution of the European Parliament." Eight pairs of eyes looked at me as if I had committed
the greatest sin in life even to mention that the resolutions of
the European Parliament were worthy of any discussion. He
said, "Mr. Brinkhorst, you are here for the very first time. In the
Council of Ministers we do not discuss the resolutions of the European Parliament." I have gone to many Council meetings
since, but this first experience has stayed with me. That kind of
closed culture has been to the detriment of the credibility of the
European Union for many, many years.
Now someone has said that the European Union is really a
conspiracy of the initiators. To a certain extent, you might say
that is true. At the time the European Community (or "Community") was created, we had a totally different political culture,
both in the Member States, but certainly in the international
field. The European Community concentrated on highly technical matters-economic matters, trade matters, matters that were
* Member of the European Parliament; former Director-General of Directorate
General XI Environment and Consumer Protection.
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relevant to the farmers, and the public at large was really not
very interested. In general, the concept of democracy was a
somewhat different one, so it is understandable that the focus at
the time was on the executive and not on the legislative powers.
I remember the famous Belgian statesman, a Founding Father of the European Community, Paul-Henri Spaak, who, when
discussing the institutional set-up of the Western European
Union, exclaimed, "Oh God, we forgot the Parliament-on a
oublii la coiffure parlementaire."1 Parliamentary involvement was
seen as an accessory rather than a major constituent element of
these international organizations.
Now, you cannot hold it against the authors of the time.
The Founders of the Community all had good intentions, and
certainly in the international field, parliaments have never
played an important role. And at that time, European Union
issues were mainly seen as international affairs. So, in a sense, it
is the vitium originis, or the original vice, of the European Union
that the parliamentary dimension never took hold, not even
when national parliaments agreed to important transfers of sovereignty.
We are now, thirty-five years later, talking about the democratic dimension, about the lack of legitimacy, and national parliaments' attempt to claim back power. They are not trying to
claim back power from the European Parliament; they are claiming back something that they lost forty years ago, from their governments. They have woken up to the fact that they cannot
recuperate it, just as you cannot undo an omelette once you
have broken the eggs. That is the reason why a High Council of
national parliamentarians would, in my view, be a bad thing; it
would be a very retrograde action.
So basically, the Council of Ministers was created as a hybrid
organism right from the beginning. It served as an executive
and a legislator at the same time. This hybrid nature necessarily
leads to official secrecy, although at the informal level, news filters through. Some of what actually happens has been recorded
in Agence Europe, a European daily press agency. That is a very
different thing, however, from the formal transparency and official publicity that is needed in an open society.
For many years the executive and the legislative remained
1. Translated as "We forgotten to top it all off with the Parliament."
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linked, and for that reason the whole structure remained closed.
Within this structure, the European Commission has its own role
to play.
The Commission derives its strength from its collegiate nature. The Commission is also by necessity a closed body. It must
act as one in proposing a legislative act, taking into account the
interest of the Community as a whole. The right of initiative of
the Commission is crucial and an act on which the whole legislative procedure rests. The Commission could not have fulfilled
the role that has been assigned to it if any dissent within its ranks
were publicized. The confidential nature of the Commission is
of the essence, even if it is steeped in French culture.
Now for the coiffure parlementaire. It was deemed necessary
to add a parliamentary dimension at the start of the European
Community, but the European Parliament initially was composed of delegations of national parliamentarians. The European Parliament began as an assembly of national parliamentarians who did it as a side job and who liked to go to Strasbourg
because the wine was good and the dinners were fine. But they
were not really there to control the Commission or the Council.
And then, of course, national parliamentarians, the fourth
element of the equation, had even less to do. They were not
even aware that the European Union was becoming the most
important constitutional structure in the post-war period. For
them it was international affairs. There were a few individuals
going to Strasbourg who enjoyed themselves, but the real business was being done in the national parliaments. That is why
national parliaments lost their grip on European affairs.
Now, why are we in a fascinating period of change? I agree
that the big change came in the period after Maastricht,2 but
already somewhat earlier, in the 1980s, institutional changes
took place. You may recall that in the late 1970s and early-1980s
the Community was moribund. We were not handling the oil
crisis; we were not handling the inflation period; we were renationalizing. But in the early-1980s, the business community
rediscovered the European Union. It was in reaction to Japa2. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]).
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nese competitiveness, to American competitiveness, which had
weathered the storms of the 197 0s and early-1980s, and it was
business.
The will to reestablish ourselves on the global market led to
the Single European Act.3 The Single European Act did not
come because we wanted to protect the environment or do anything about social affairs. We wanted to regain our competitive
edge vis-A-vis the Americans and the Japanese.
But then, very soon, we discovered that the Single European
Act also involved European civil society. It involved the environment community-you cannot have norms on car emissions
without actually taking into account the environmental dimension; you cannot do anything about food safety without taking
into account consumers-and the consumers and the environment community suddenly discovered that the Community decision-making structure was a closed shop. That is when the revolt
started.
By the time the Maastricht Treaty was being negotiated, an
increasing number of people realized that creating a single European currency would affect each individual citizen of the European Union, and that is the moment when the revolt really
gathered momentum.
I have gone a little bit into that background to explain why
the watershed that we are witnessing now is, in my mind, going
to change the practice fundamentally, although it will still take
some time.
I now come more to de lega lata, not only de lege ferendaDeclaration No. 17' was added to the Maastricht Treaty, and basically states no more than that the principle of access to information is needed in order to strengthen the transparency of decision-making. It is no more than a statement of principles.
Christian Timmermans, quite rightly, distinguished access of information from the decision-making process.
Progress on the access of information only occurred after
the difficulties of the Maastricht Treaty ratification process-I
3. SEA, supra note 2, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
4. See TEU, supra note 2, Declaration on the right of access to information, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 785, 31 I.L.M. at 367 (annexed to Treaty on European Union ("TEU"))
(stating that "the transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration").
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refer to the initial Danish "No," I refer to the French difficulties
in this Referendum, and of course to the narrow ratification vote
in the United Kingdom. 5 The essential point was that the citizens of Europe, civil society, and non-governmental organizations had become fed-up with the secrecy of the Commission
and of the Council.
Let me just add one other sort of personal note. At that
time, I was Director-General for the Environment. We started
drafting something called the Access to Information Directive. 6
The environment, of course, belongs to everybody, and therefore it belongs to nobody, whereas transport, for example, pertains to the transporters, and agriculture pertains to the farmers.
The development of a European environmental policy depends
for its credibility solely on the availability of objective information. It was necessary, for example, to understand what chemical
plants were doing, what the petrochemical factories were doing,
and what domestic households were doing with their waste. So
we had an interest in drafting an Access to Information Directive
in the field of the environment.
To begin with, I had great difficulty in getting the Commission to accept such a text because of its closed culture to which I
referred before. Also, the most relevant information in the environmental field rested with the Member States. In the end, it
was proposed by the Commission, adopted by the Council, and
the Member States have accepted the obligations of the Directive.
But then they said, "Well, how about the Commission? Can
we also get data from the Commission?" I think Christian Timmermans was already Deputy Director-General. The Commission said, "Well, let's look at that later, when we have general
access to information." I say this to show that this mentality is
recent.
I limit myself to these comments on this point because I
5. See

GEORGE

A.

BERMANN ET AL.,

1998

SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 2 (1998) (discussing ratification of TEU in Denmark and
United Kingdom); GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY LAw 18 (1993) (mentioning Danish referendum rejecting TEU and French
referendum approving TEU by slim majority).
6. Council Directive No. 90/313 of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment, OJ. L 158/56 (1990).
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would like to also reorient the discussion on what actually happened in Amsterdam.
The Council and the Commission in the meantime have
adopted acts for the access to information and access to documents. Parliament has followed suit with, I think, a very good
text on access to information. On a number of points, the limitations on access to information in the Commission's document
go beyond what is in the Parliament's.
As far as the Amsterdam Treaty is concerned, a fundamental
point to recognize is that what was originally a vaguely-formulated principle has now become a formal right. Now again, this
right has to be translated into practice.
Christian Timmermans quite rightly referred to the new Article 151 (3), which requires the Council to publish the results of
their votes, to publish the explanation of votes, and to publish
the statements and the minutes.7 For the first time, Member
States' parliaments will have the opportunity of knowing what
their governments really have been doing. That has not been
the case, with perhaps the exception of Denmark, where the culture of openness is deeply rooted.
Access to documents has gained even more relevance because of the increasing importance of the "third pillar."' In the
Treaty of Amsterdam, cooperation within the third pillar-police and judicial matters-must provide citizens with a high level
of safety within an area of freedom, security, and justice.
One of the very fundamental frustrations for parliamentarians over the last five or six years has been to keep track of what
has been decided by the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs.
The culture of secrecy surrounding their activities is pervasive.
7. See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, art.
2(39), O.J. C 340/1, at 43 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]
(replacing art. 151 of Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"));
Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art. 207(3),
O.J. C 340/3, at 266 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 122 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty] (art. 151(3) of EC Treaty), incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the EC Treaty will
be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340, at 78-79 (1997).
8. See Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the
European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 746, 751 (1998) (identifying Title VI of TEU as
"third pillar" of European Union).
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Yet the area of Justice and Home Affairs is particularly relevant
to citizens, more so than Common Foreign and Security Policy.9
Citizens are directly confronted with the repercussions of these
decisions, and the attainment of freedom, security, and justice is
a very delicate balance. This area of Justice and Home Affairs
will definitely be the test case in matters of transparency and access to information.
Last year not less than seventy percent of all the Council
texts were texts in the field of justice and home affairs. Ten
years ago we did not even have the Justice and Home Affairs
Council, and five years ago about fifteen percent of those documents were not known to anybody except to those who had
drafted them. That means that at the end of the twentieth century in this particular policy area, we are governed in the same
way as the Congress of Vienna was running Europe about two
hundred years ago.
The major change in mentality will occur, however, in those
policy areas where Parliament has the right of co-decision. In
accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council will have
to indicate when it is acting in a legislative capacity-which is
tricky because that could mean that the Council must then act in
co-decision with Parliament. In that co-decision procedure, Parliament and Council will have identical rights, as Mr. Petite and
Mr. Maganza have stated. No parliamentarian will accept cooperation with the Council on the basis of secret texts. I think that
co-decision will be a determining factor in the change in political culture that must occur.
Now, I have not said anything about the role of the
Ombudsman. The office of the Ombudsman was introduced by
the Maastricht Treaty.1 ° In preparing the First Report of the
Ombudsman,11 the Ombudsman requested from all the institu-

tions and bodies in the European Union a document on their
policy of publication and access to information. You will see
9. See TEU, supra note 2, tit. V, O.J. C 224/1, at 94-96 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
94-96.
10. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 138e, O.J.
C 224/1, at 56 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 677-78 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by TEU, supra note 2 (setting forth responsibilities of Ombudsman).
11. The European Ombudsman: Report for the year 1995 (visited Sept. 28, 1998)
<htpp://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/report95/en/default.htm> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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some quite remarkable replies. But the fact that the
Ombudsman's report has been published, the fact that it will be
discussed in the Parliament, will already change the culture.
One final point perhaps on secondary legislation. It is an
issue that has not been covered today, but I will try to give you an
idea of what developments, from a parliamentary point of view,
are taking place. You will see a renewed struggle between the
institutions on the so-called issue of Comitology1 2 and the related issue of hierarchy of norms. The existence of hundreds of
committees made up of representatives of Member States controlling Commission actions in the field of secondary legislation
and the unclear distinction between primary and secondary legislation was first raised during the negotiations on the Single European Act. It came up at Maastricht; it was not resolved in
Maastricht. It came up in Amsterdam; it was not resolved in Amsterdam.
These issues keep coming back because they contain the
real danger of undermining Parliament's acquired rights of codecision and thereby the democratic input in the legislative process. The so-called modus vivendi, which states that the Council
and the Commission will inform the Parliament about what happens within the committees, will no longer suffice. Parliament
will react very strongly to what the Commission is going to put
forward as a result of the Declaration No. 31 of Amsterdam,1 3
which I think is due to come in June or September of this year.
I think that here we have a real issue. The real issue is to
what extent the Council and the Parliament will be on equal
footing as far as secondary legislation is concerned. We know
that not only in the field of agriculture, but also in many, many
committees a lot of things are happening that the individual citizen-let alone the individual parliamentarian-does not know.
So we will have to come to the end of this vicious circle of secrecy. The battle is not over, it has just started, but the watershed is there.

12. For a discussion of Comitology, see PJ.G.
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

KAPTEVN, INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW

240-47 (Lawrence Gormly ed., 2d ed. 1989).

13. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 7, Declaration relating to the Council Decision of 13 July 1987, O.J. C 340/1, at 137 (1997).

